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We present a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between asset markets that are distinguished
only by the levels of capital invested in each. Investment in that market with the greatest amount of
capital earns the lowest risk premium. Intermediaries optimally trade off the costs of intermediation
against fees that depend on the gain they can offer to investors for moving their capital to the market
with the higher mean return. Those fees also depend on the bargaining power of the investor, in light
of potential alternative intermediaries. In equilibrium, the speeds of adjustment of mean returns and
of capital between the two markets are increasing in the degree to which capital is imbalanced between
the two markets.
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We present a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between markets. Equi-
librium conditional mean rates of return vary across markets according to the levels of
capital invested in the respective markets. As a matter of supply and demand within each
market, that market with the greater amount of capital earns lower conditional mean re-
turns. Given a suﬃcient disparity in the capital levels in the markets, intermediaries ﬁnd
it optimal to search for investors in the market with “surplus” capital and oﬀer them the
opportunity to move their capital to the other market, which oﬀers higher risk premia.
Intermediaries charge investors a fee that is based on their gain from the move and based
on the degree of competition in the market for intermediation. The equilibrium behavior
of intermediaries is solved analytically, and characterized. Competition among intermedi-
aries can in some cases reduce intermediation in equilibrium, relative to the monopolistic
case.
This paper is motivated by empirical evidence, some of which is reviewed in the last
section, that supply or demand shocks in asset markets, in addition to causing an im-
mediate price response, also lead to adjustments over time in the distribution of capital
across markets and adjustments over time in relative conditional mean asset returns, in
a way that reﬂects delays in the adjustments of investors’ portfolios. We are particu-
larly interested in how those adjustments are aﬀected by the endogenous behavior of
intermediaries.
In our equilibrium model, the greater the relative diﬀerence in capital levels across the
markets, the more intensive are intermediaries’ eﬀorts to re-balance the distribution of
capital across the markers, and the greater is the rate of convergence of the mean rates of
return of diﬀerent assets toward a common level. We study the impact on capital mobility
of search costs, discounting, asset volatility, and other parameters.
An example is the limited mobility of capital into reinsurance markets, documented
by Froot and O’Connell (1999), who write: “Our results suggest that capital market
imperfections are more important than shifts in actuarial valuation for understanding
catastrophe reinsurance pricing. Supply, rather than demand, shifts seem to explain
most features of the market in the aftermath of a loss.” In subsequent work, Froot
(2001) continues: “We ... ﬁnd the most compelling (evidence) to be supply restrictions
associated with capital market imperfections and market power exerted by traditional
2reinsurers.”
We are particularly interested in the impact of competition among intermediaries on
the equilibrium degree of capital mobility, through two channels. First, an intermediary
does not internalize the entire impact of its search activity on leveling the distribution
of capital across markets because each intermediary gets only a fraction of aggregate
intermediation fees. This prompts intermediaries to search more as the number of inter-
mediaries increases, all else equal. Competition among intermediaries has a second and
potentially oﬀsetting eﬀect on capital mobility through the impact of fee bargaining on
incentives to intermediate. In the simplest setting that we analyze, the second eﬀect can
in dominate, so that in some cases increasing the number of intermediaries reduces capital
mobility.
A signiﬁcant body of theory examines the implications of search frictions for asset
pricing. For example, diﬀerences in search frictions across diﬀerent asset markets are
treated by Weill (2008) and Vayanos and Wang (2007). Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu, and Pedersen
(2005) study the implications of search frictions in a single asset market with market
making. In the context of a single asset market, Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu, and Pedersen (2007)
and Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weil (2008) model recoveries in mean returns after a shock
to the preferences of investors, corresponding to a gradual re-allocation of the asset to
more suitable investors, rather than by cross-market capital dynamics as here. Earlier
search-based models of intermediation include those of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987),
Bhattacharya and Hagerty (1987), Moresi (1991), Gehrig (1993), and Yava¸ s (1996).
Related work on the implications of capital market frictions for asset pricing dynamics
includes the models of Basak and Croitoru (2000) and He and Krishnamurthy (2007). In
terms of some objectives and model features, independent work by Gromb and Vayanos
(2009) is closely related to ours. Common to our models, local hedgers are immobile,
while arbitrageurs can work across markets, driving returns toward fundamental levels,
subject to frictions that prevent them from perfectly equating returns in the two markets.
Our respective approaches, however, are quite diﬀerent. We focus on the dynamics of
intermediation, capital movements, and risk premia.
Section 2 describes the market setting. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the monopolistic and
oligopolistic intermediation cases, respectively. Section 5 summarizes the implications of
our model for asset-price dynamics and provides some evidence regarding the premise
3or implications of our model. Proofs and several extensions of the model are found in
Appendices. Appendices F through K are located in Duﬃe and Strulovici (2011), a
supplement to this paper.
2 The Market Setting
This section presents a stylized model for the endogenous adjustment of capital and risk
premia across markets. There are three types of agents: (i) local hedgers; (ii) investors
who provide risk-bearing to hedgers in each of two local markets; and (iii) intermediaries
(such as asset managers) who provide the fee-based service to investors of moving capital
from the “over-capitalized” market to that market with less capital, thereby allowing
them to earn a higher premium for the same risk.
We ﬁx a probability space (Ω,ℱ, ) and a common information ﬁltration {ℱ  :   ≥ 0}
satisfying the usual conditions.1
In each of two ﬁnancial markets, labeled   and  , a continuum (a non-atomic measure
space) of local risk-averse agents own short-lived risky assets that they are willing to
sell at or above their respective reservation prices. Equivalently, they are willing to buy
insurance contracts against the risks to which they are exposed. These “hedgers” are not
mobile across markets. They can be viewed in this respect as relatively unsophisticated
in the use of cross-capital-market transactions, or as having high transactions costs for
trading outside of their local markets. A continuum of investors that supply capital have
access to cross-market trading, subject to intermediation frictions to be described. These
suppliers of capital are risk-neutral, oﬀering to bear the risk that hedgers desire to shed
in return for any strictly positive risk premium. In an insurance context, one might think
of these suppliers of capital as stylized versions of the “Names” that supply risk bearing
capacity to the insurance market known as “Lloyd’s of London.”
The total levels of capital available in the two markets at time   are     and    ,
respectively. Capital can be reinvested continually at the discretion of each investor, that
is, “rolled over” in the short-lived assets that are continually made available for sale by
hedgers. Each unit of capital that is currently invested in market   at time   is paid cash
1See, for example, Protter (2004) for the usual conditions and for other standard properties of stochastic processes
to which we refer.
4at the equilibrium dividend rate  (   ), where  (⋅) is a strictly decreasing continuous
function. The dividend rate  (   ) is continually reset in double auctions at which the
supply and demand for the asset in market   are matched at each point in time. As the
amount of capital available to invest in the asset is increased, the market-clearing dividend
rate declines. In Appendix F, we provide an example in which  ( ) is the equilibrium
insurance premium in a market with   units of insurance capital.
In return for the dividend rate  (   ), the provider of each unit of capital in market
  agrees to absorb losses of capital in proportion to the increments of a L´ evy process   .
(That is,    has independently and identically distributed increments over non-overlapping
time periods of the same length. Examples include Brownian motions, Poisson processes,
compound Poisson processes, and linear combinations of these.) The idea is that the short-
lived risky asset promises 1+     + (   )   at time  +   per unit of capital invested at
time  , in the instantaneous sense. More precisely, each unit of capital invested in market  
at any time  , and rolled over continually in that market until some time   >   accumulates
to    units of capital according to the stochastic diﬀerential equation     =   −     ,
and in the meantime generates cash ﬂows at the rate   −  (   ). (The notation “  −”
means the left limit of the path of   at time  , that is, the level just before any jump at
time  .)
In the illustrative case of an insurance market, we can take    to be a compound
Poisson process that jumps down at the arrival times of loss events, and is otherwise
constant. In this case, one unit of capital invested at time   pays the supplier of capital
1 +  (   )   at time   +    (in the above instantaneous sense) if there is no loss event,
and if there is a loss event, has a recovery value of 1 + Δ   , where Δ    is the jump size.
The jumps of    are bounded below by −1, preserving limited liability. If the loss events
have mean arrival rate   and a loss-size distribution   with mean  , then the mean loss
rate is   . The risk-neutral investors therefore optimally supply all of their local capital
inelastically so long as the mean rate of return  ( )−   is strictly larger than their time
preference rate  . This necessary condition on an equilibrium cash payout function  (⋅)
is satisﬁed in the cases that we examine, as indicated in Appendix A.
As with typical asset-management contracts used by private-equity partnerships, cash
payouts are not re-invested into the capital pool. For us, this assumption is merely a
modeling convenience.
5We assume that    =    +    and    =    +   , where the market-speciﬁc processes   
and    as well as the common component    are independent L´ evy processes. We assume
that    and    have the same distribution, so that the two markets have identically and
symmetrically distributed risks. This symmetry simpliﬁes the calculation of an equilib-
rium and has the further illustrative advantage that any diﬀerences in the conditional
expected returns in the two markets are due solely to diﬀerences in the capital levels of
the markets. We brieﬂy discuss the asymmetric case in Section 5.
If there were no capital-market frictions, investors would instantly move capital be-
tween the markets so as to obtain the higher dividend rate, and in doing so would equate
the dividend rates  (   ) and  (   ), and thereby equate     and     at all times. In-
deed, given the symmetrically distributed returns of the two markets, investors would do
so even if they were risk-averse, provided that they have no other hedging motives.
Frictions in the movement of capital may, however, lead to unequal levels of capital
in the two markets. If, for example,     <    , then the conditional excess mean rate of
return of the risky asset in market   exceeds that in market   by  (   )− (   ), despite
the identical idiosyncratic and systematic risks of the two assets. Whichever market has
“too much capital” receives the lower risk premium.
An investor chooses how to deploy re-invested capital between the two markets, subject
to the available trading technology. Letting    denote the net cumulative amount of
capital moved by a particular investor from market   into market   through time  , this
investor’s capital levels,    
   in market   and    
   in market  , thus satisfy
  
 
   =  
 




   =  
 
  −      +    .
Capital can be moved only when in contact with an intermediary, as will be explained.
A model for a proportional intermediation-fee process   will be determined in equilib-
rium. An investor is inﬁnitely-lived, and thus has a utility of
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where ∣ ∣  denotes the total variation of   up to time  . A minor alteration of the model
6that allows for randomly timed exit and entrance of investors would be equally tractable.2
For simplicity, we have assumed that transactions costs are paid directly by investors, and
not deducted from the capital moved from market to market.
Because there is a continuum of investors, each takes as given the total capital processes
   and    of the respective markets.
Intermediaries contact investors in order to proﬁt from fees for moving their capital
from one market to another. In equilibrium, at any time, only investors in that market
with greater capital agree to have any of their capital moved to the other market. Because
an investor has linear preferences, it is optimal when contacted to move either no capital
or to move all capital to the other market.3
We let    ( ) denote the level of capital in market   of investor   at time  . Condi-
tional on the intensity process   for contacts of investors by intermediaries, investors are
contacted pairwise independently4 at the conditional mean rate   . In a manner similar
to that of Weill (2007), the exact law of large numbers allows us to calculate the aggregate
rate of movement of capital. Letting  (⋅) denote the non-atomic measure over the space
of investors, the total rate at which capital is moved from market   to market   is almost
surely5
 
  1{ at > bt}   ( )  ( ) =   1{ at > bt}
 
   ( )  ( )
=   1{ at > bt}   .
2For this, investors would exit at exponentially distributed times that are pairwise independent, and consume their
capital at exit. New investors would appear in proportion to the current levels of capital. Any diﬀerence between exit
and entrance rates would thus be subtracted from the proportional drifts of the capital accumulation processes  a
and  b.
3If he or she has any capital in the market with more total capital, then all of this investor’s capital will be moved,
provided the proportional transaction-costs process   is not too large, and this is the case in any equilibrium for our
model, as we shall see once the model is completely speciﬁed. Thus, although we allow that a given supplier of capital
may initially have non-zero capital in both markets, all of his or her invested capital will optimally be held in just one
of the two markets at any time after the ﬁrst time of contact with an intermediary.
4That is, conditional on the path { t :   ≥ 0} of the intermediation intensity process, the times of contacts of any
distinct pair of investors,   and  , are the event times of independent Poisson processes  i and  j with the common
time-varying intensity process  .
5Sun (2006) shows that the probability space, the agent space, and the measurable subsets of their product can
be constructed so as to satisfy the exact law of large numbers. With this, the total quantity of contacts of agents by
intermediaries up to time   is
 
 it   ( ) =
  t
0  s    almost surely.
7Likewise, the rate at which capital moves from market   to market   is   1{ bt > at}   .
Our model can be generalized by supposing that each investor also has a personal
technology by which opportunities to move capital to the other market arrive at random
times, independent across investors, with a constant mean arrival rate. This would cause
only minor modiﬁcations to the structure and solution of our model. We avoid it for
simplicity. Increasing the mean arrival rates of these alternative capital-shifting opportu-
nities reduces the average degree of imbalance of capital and the diﬀerence in risk premia
between the two markets, and thus reduces the proﬁtability of intermediation. In Section
5, we review some evidence of inattention by investors that presents an opportunity for
proﬁtable contacts by intermediaries.
An intermediary’s rate of cost for applying contact intensity    is    , for some techno-
logical cost coeﬃcient   ≥ 0. For example, doubling the expected rate at which investors
are contacted costs the intermediary twice as much.6 The maximum feasible contact
intensity of the market is some constant   > 0.
3 The Monopolistic Case
We begin with the case of a monopolistic intermediary. We restrict attention to the
illustrative example of an insurance market in which each loss event aﬀects only one of the
two markets and results in a total loss of capital (  = 1). Appendices treat more general
cases, including partial recovery, loss events that can aﬀect both markets simultaneously,
as well as proportional losses and gains that are based on Brownian motion.
3.1 Equilibrium
We will deﬁne and characterize equilibria in which the intermediation intensity is of the
symmetric Markov form    = Λ(  ,  ), for some measurable policy function Λ : ℝ2
+ →
[0, ], where
   = max(   ,   )
   = min(   ,   ).
6This can be viewed as a contact technology in which the intermediary adjusts a “broadcast” intensity, for example
adjusting the rate of purchase of advertisements or other forms of market-wide intermediation eﬀorts. This diﬀers
from a model in which, for example, contacting twice as many individuals at a given intensity costs twice as much.
8The monopolistic intermediation fee is assumed to be a fraction   of the gain in present
value to an investor associated with redeploying the investor’s capital from the over-
capitalized market, that with   , to the undercapitalized market. This fraction is endo-
genized in Section 4 for the case of multiple intermediaries. The continuation value of
an investor per unit of capital in the market with excess capital can be represented as
 (  ,  ), for some   : ℝ2
+ → [0,∞), and likewise for the present value  (  ,  ) of each
unit of capital in the under-capitalized market.
These values, deﬁned from primitive stochastic processes in Appendix A, include the
eﬀects of future movements of capital to a market that is under-capitalized and, once
that market becomes over-capitalized, back to the other market, and so on, net of fees.
Assuming diﬀerentiability, which we will verify in equilibrium, Itˆ o’s formula implies that
  and   are characterized as solutions to the coupled equations
  ( , ) =  ( ) −   ( , ) Λ( , ) +   ( , ) Λ( , )
+(1 −  )Λ( , )( ( , )−  ( , )) −   ( , ) +  ( ( ,0) −  ( , )) (1)
  ( , ) =  ( ) −   ( , ) Λ( , ) +   ( , ) Λ( , )
+ ( ( ,0)−  ( , )) −   ( , ), (2)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The ﬁrst of these equations states that, in
the over-capitalized market, the rate of loss in value due to time preference,   ( , ), is
equal to the total expected rate of net proﬁt to investment in that market. That rate of
expected proﬁt includes, ﬁrst of all, the dividend payout rate  ( ). The next two terms
are the rates of change of  (  ,  ) due to intermediated ﬂows of capital out of the over-
capitalized market and into the under-capitalized market, respectively. The following term
is the expected rate of gain (1 −  )Λ( , )( ( , )−  ( , )), net of intermediation fees,
associated with the chance to switch to the higher-premium under-capitalized market.
The ﬁnal two terms reﬂect the expected rate of impact of loss events. As the basic
version of the model assumes no recovery value at these events,   ( , ) is the expected
loss in value due to the occurrence of these loss events in the investor’s market. The ﬁnal
term  ( ( ,0)− ( , )) is the expected gain to the investor associated with a loss event
in the other market. The second equation, for the total rate of investment return while
in the undercapitalized market, is similarly explained.
9Fixing an intermediation policy Λ, the gain in present value per unit of redeployed
capital at time  , before the associated fee, is
 
Λ(  ,  ) =  (  ,  ) −  (  ,  ).
Thus, at bargaining power  , the intermediary’s fee per unit of redeployed capital is
   Λ(  ,  ).
If forced to accept the fees associated with a conjectured intermediation policy Γ, a
monopolistic intermediary’s optimal value for beginning with capital levels   and   in the
respective markets is
  ( , ) = sup
Λ
 
   ∞
0
 
−  Λ(  ,  )(    
Γ(  ,  ) −  )  
 
. (3)
If a policy Λ that solves this problem is the same as conjectured policy Γ, then we say
that Λ is an equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium, fees are based on consistent conjectures
by investors of the monopolist’s future intermediation intensity process.
We assume, and later verify, that the intermediary’s equilibrium initial value   ( , ) is
ﬁnite and diﬀerentiable. The associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, when
fees are determined by a conjectured intermediation policy Γ, is
0 = sup
ℓ∈[0, ]
{−   ( , ) +  ( , , ,ℓ,Γ)}, (4)
where, by Itˆ o’s formula,
 ( , , ,ℓ,Γ) = −  ( , )ℓ +  ( , )ℓ + [  ( ,0)+  ( ,0)−2  ( , )]+ℓ(   
Γ( , )− ).
Proposition 1 (HJB Equation) Given an assumed intermediation policy Γ, suppose
that ˆ   is a bounded diﬀerentiable function satisfying the HJB equation (4). Then ˆ   is
the value function   of the optimization problem (3) and any measurable policy ( , )  →
Λ( , ) which, for each ( , ), attains the supremum (4) is an optimal policy.
The proof given in Appendix A.2 is by a traditional martingale veriﬁcation argument.
10From the HJB equation, it is optimal for a monopolistic intermediary to search at
maximal intensity for opportunities to move capital whenever it is strictly beneﬁcial to
search at all, and this is precisely when
  




The left-hand side is the fee per unit of capital moved, net of the associated marginal
loss in present value of future intermediation fees. This loss in future fees is caused by
the associated reduction in heterogeneity of capital levels across the two markets, which
always lowers the gain to investors of shifting their capital. The right-hand side of (5) is
the cost of search per unit of capital that can be attracted.
In order to obtain the simpliﬁcation associated with homogeneity,7 we suppose that
the inverse demand function  (⋅) is of the form  0 +  /  for positive constants  0 and
 . As explained in the insurance setting of Appendix F, this can be arranged by suitable
assumptions on the cross-sectional distribution of hedgers’ aversions to loss risk. Capital is
therefore optimally reinvested locally, absent an opportunity to move capital to a diﬀerent
market, so long as the mean rate of return to investment exceeds the discount rate. This
is always the case if  0 >   +  , which we assume throughout. Because the constant  0
is common to the two markets, however, it has no eﬀect on beneﬁts to switching capital
and the analysis proceeds without loss of generality by ignoring  0 (treating it as though
equal to zero) from this point.8
Because the intermediary has linear time-additive preferences and because of the ho-
mogeneity of  , it is natural to look for equilibria for which the ratio   =  /  of total
capital in the over-capitalized market to total capital in the under-capitalized market de-
termines the optimal intermediation intensity, and we focus on such equilibria from now
on. A loss event causes the capital ratio   /   to jump to +∞. While we allow this
formally, the analysis can be done similarly in terms of the ratio   /  , which remains in
[0,1] almost surely, and our results apply with only notational changes.9
7In Appendix A, some results are shown for the more general case  ( ) =  0 +   −￿ for where   is any positive
constant.
8The present value of a marginal unit of capital includes the constant  0/ , regardless of the intermediary’s and
investors’ strategies.
9Provided the initial conditions include a strictly positive amount of capital in at least one market, the probability
that  t and  t ever reach zero at the same time is 0. The partial-recovery case that we analyze in Appendix I has
11The homogeneity of the payout-rate function   and policy Λ implies that   and  
are homogeneous of degree −1. As a result,  ( ,0) =  0  −1 for some positive constant
 0 to be determined. Letting  ( ) =   Λ( ,1)/  and  ( ) = Λ( ,1), homogeneity of   Λ
and direct calculation from (1)-(2) implies that   solves the ordinary diﬀerential equation
0 = −  ( ) + (1 −  
−1) −   ( ) 
′( ) + (−  ( ) −   
′( )) ( ) 
−(1 −  ) ( ) ( ) +  [ 0(1 −  
−1) − 2 ( )]. (6)
The relevant boundary condition is  (1) = 0, corresponding to no gain from switching
when the two markets have the same capital levels. Using (6), Appendix A.3 provides a
proof of the following result that the switching gain  ( ) is strictly positive when capital
levels are unequal.
Proposition 2 Given any intermediation policy Λ,  ( ) is strictly positive for   > 1.
That is, given any Λ, investors in the over-capitalized market optimally accept the oﬀer to
move all of their capital out of the over-capitalized market whenever given the opportunity.
Taking   Λ as given, the optimal present value   of intermediation proﬁts is homo-
geneous of degree 0, that is,   ( , ) =   ( / ,1) for   > 0. In particular, the policy Λ
achieving the supremum of the HJB equation (4) must also be homogeneous of degree 0;
that is, Λ( , ) =  ( / ) for some  (⋅). Because the switching-gain function   depends
on the policy function  , the determination of equilibrium is reduced to a ﬁxed-point
problem: Find a pair ( , ) such that: (i) given  , the policy   is optimal, and (ii) given
 , the marginal gain function   is that determined by   through (6).
In Appendix A.5 (Proposition 12), we show that any equilibrium must be of the
“bang-bang” form:
Λ( , ) = 0,   <   ,
=  ,   ≥   ,
strictly positive capital levels in both markets at all times after time zero, given a strictly positive level of capital in
at least one of the markets at time zero. In that context, the assumption that loss events strike only one of the two
markets at a time is without loss of generality because any common jump component would have no eﬀect on the ratio
of   to   . The sole exception is a case of common jumps with a jump-size distribution that supports −1, in which
case there is a non-zero probability that  t and  t can be zero simultaneously. For the same reason, it is without loss
of generality when characterizing equilibria that the return processes  a and  b have no drift, that is, a component
that is linear in  . Any common Brownian component is likewise irrelevant to optimal intermediation behavior.
12for some trigger ratio   ≥ 1 of the capital level in the over-capitalized market to the
capital level in the under-capitalized market. This is intuitive. Because the HJB equation
is linear with respect the intensity chosen by the intermediary, we anticipate the optimality
of switching from minimal to maximal intensity whenever there is suﬃcient marginal gain
from moving capital from one market to the other. This occurs when the levels of capital
in the two markets are suﬃciently diﬀerent. Our problem is reduced to ﬁnding an optimal
trigger ratio  , which then completely determines equilibrium behavior.
The diﬀerential equation (6) for   now reduces to
(  + 2  +  [(1 −  ) +  ]) ( ) +  (1 +  )  






,   ≥  , (7)
and






,   ∈ [1, ]. (8)
For   ∈ [1, ], the solution is trivial:
 ( ) =
1 +   0







In particular, we verify that  (1) = 0, consistent with the observation that the net present
value of moving capital from one market to the other is 0 when the levels of capital in
the two markets are the same.
We can re-write (7) as







 ,   ≥  , (10)
where   = (  + 2  + (1 −  ) )/  and   = (1 +   0)/ .
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where  0 =   ( ,0)/  =   ( ,0)/ . Therefore




  + 2 
 0 <  0, (13)
13and
  ( ) +  
′( ) (1 +  ) =   +    ( ),   ≥  , (14)








Appendix A.4 contains a proof of the following monotonicity and regularity of  (⋅).
Monotonicity of the value  ( ) in the capital heterogeneity measure   is not an obvious
result, in particular because the switching gain  ( ) is not in general monotonic. That
is, ﬁxing the capital level   = 1 in the market with less capital, the marginal gain  ( )
from switching capital from the over-capitalized market to the undercapitalized market
need not be monotone in   even though the increase in payout rate  ( )− ( ) is strictly
monotone in  . This is the case because, as   gets large, both  ( ) and ℎ( ) ≡  ( ,1)/ 
go to zero, and so must therefore  ( ) = ℎ( ) −  ( ) go to zero. Intuitively, as   gets
large, the global amount of capital is large, and although it can be intermediated from
one market to another, the value of being a capitalist is not attractive when there is “too
much” capital relative to the demand by hedgers to lay oﬀ risk.
The intuition for monotonicity of  ( ), however, is that, for any assumed trigger ratio
 , optimal or not, the total rate of activated intermediation fees     ( ), per unit of
capital in the over-capitalized market, is not relevant on [0, ] by deﬁnition of  , and is
strictly increasing in   above  . In particular, even though  ( ) need not be monotone
in  ,   ( ) is monotone in  , as shown in Appendix A.4.
Proposition 3 (Value Function Monotonicity) For any trigger capital ratio  ,
the solution   of (11)-(14) is bounded, increasing, and strictly increasing on [ ,∞).
The smooth-pasting condition  ′( ) = 0 implies the trigger capital ratio
  = 1 +
 (  + 2 )
(1 +   0)  
. (15)
In order to identify the constant  0, we use a conservation equation: The sum of the
value functions of all investors and of the intermediary must be equal to the present value
of all cash dividend payments net of the search costs incurred by the intermediary. After
calculations shown in Appendix A.3, this conservation principle is equivalent to
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−   (1,0), (16)
14where  ( ) = log(1 + 1/ )/¯  .
A proof of the following result guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of a trigger
strategy is found in Appendices A.6 (existence) and A.7 (uniqueness).
Proposition 4 (Existence and Uniqueness) There exists a unique trigger capital-
ization ratio   satisfying (16), (7), (8), and (15).
This analysis leads to the following characterization of equilibrium, which includes the
result that in the absence of search costs, the intermediary does not exploit his position
to restrict movement of capital, but rather provides maximal intermediation, nevertheless
generating fee income from his or her imperfect ability to instantaneously move capital
from one market to the other due to the upper bound   on contact intensity. As   becomes
large, the capital levels will be nearly equated across the two markets at all times, as in
a completely frictionless market, and in the limit there would be no intermediation rents.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the payout-rate function   is of the form  ( ) =  0 + / .
Then there exists a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium, there is no intermediation (   = 0)
whenever the ratio of capital levels in the two markets is between 1/  and  , for a uniquely
determined capital-ratio trigger  . Otherwise, intermediation is at full capacity (   =  ).
The trigger ratio   is given by (15), where the constant  0 is given by (16). If there is no
intermediation cost (  = 0), then the intermediary always works at full capacity (that is,
  = 1).
Relation (15) also provides an upper bound on the equilibrium capital-ratio trigger
level:
  ≤ 1 +
 (  + 2 )
  
.
This bound is useful for computing numerical solutions to the optimization problem. An
algorithm for computing the constant  0, and thus  , is given in Appendix G.
3.2 How Intermediation Depends on Market Parameters
We turn to comparative statics, focusing on the behavior of the threshold capital ratio
 . A higher trigger ratio   corresponds to less intermediation, because the intermediary
waits until   /   exceeds   before becoming maximally active. We therefore deﬁne
15capital mobility to be increasing whenever the equilibrium threshold   is decreasing. We
will show that these comparative statics carry over to the oligopolistic case.
Proposition 6 (Comparative Statics for  , , , and  .) Capital mobility is decreas-
ing in the intermediation cost coeﬃcient  , increasing in the payout-rate coeﬃcient  , and
decreasing in the discount rate  . Fixing the dividend payout rate function  (⋅), capital
mobility is decreasing in the loss-event intensity  .
A proof is provided in Appendix H. It is intuitive that increasing the costs of interme-
diation, represented by  , reduces the amount of intermediation provided in equilibrium.
Once the trigger   is chosen, the costs of search intensity are borne entirely by the in-
termediary. Other things equal, raising   therefore lowers the desire to search. The
coeﬃcients   and   aﬀect the trigger   only through the ratio  / , explaining the com-
parative static for  . The comparative statics for   and   are more subtle because, for
a given trigger ratio  , both   and   have an eﬀect on the value functions of investors.
Equation (15) is the key to understand these comparative statics. Other things equal, a
higher after-shock continuation value for investors (that is, a higher  0) results in a lower
  and thus a higher capital mobility. As the discount rate   goes up, the present value of
the intermediary’s future fees for moving capital are lower, ﬁxing the fees, which increases
the incentive to wait before expending the costs of intermediation. However, a higher  
also reduces investors’ gain from switching capital and hence the fees that they pay to the
intermediary, with an unclear impact on their value function. As we show in our proof,
the former eﬀect dominates, so   is decreasing in  .
Our proof likewise shows that   is increasing in  , holding   ﬁxed. Of course, increas-
ing the mean loss frequency   would naturally raise the equilibrium loss insurance rate
 (   ), which on its own would tend to increase intermediation (lower  ). To analyze
this eﬀect, we can write  ( ) =  0( ) +  ( )/  in order to show the dependence of the
coeﬃcients  0( ) and  ( ) on the mean loss rate  . The coeﬃcient  0( ) plays no role in
intermediation gains. The impact on intermediation intensity of replacing   with some
 ′ >   is thus equivalent to the eﬀect of leaving   unchanged and replacing the cost
coeﬃcient   with  ′ ≤   ( )/ ( ′). This eﬀect can be small or large, depending on the
sensitivity of  ( ) to  , reﬂecting how the elasticity of hedging demand varies with the
expected loss frequency. Thus, the overall impact on intermediation intensity of a given
16increase in the loss-event intensity   is to lower intermediation incentives (raise  ) pre-
cisely when the impact on  ( ) is suﬃciently small, and otherwise to raise intermediation
intensity.
Increasing the bargaining power   of the intermediary increases the fraction of the
gains to trade that goes to the intermediary, prompting the intermediary to search for
more investor capital to move, thus setting a lower trigger ratio  , holding constant the
gains to investors for moving capital. Obviously, however, raising   lowers the present
value of investors associated with future movements of capital, thus lowering the amount
of gain they have to share with the intermediary. The proof of the following result given
in Appendix H demonstrates that the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect on the
investors’ values, provided that   remains below 1/2.
Proposition 7 (Comparative Statics for  ) Capital mobility is increasing in the
bargaining power   of the intermediary, for 0 <   < 0.5.
The impact on capital mobility of the capacity   for search intensity depends on other
parameters, and particularly on the discount rate. There are situations in which lowering
  lowers the trigger ratio  , leading intermediaries to work more often, albeit with a lower
capacity when they do work. We will provide examples and some intuition for the fact
that, depending on the discount rate  , the threshold capital ratio   can either increase
or decrease with capacity.
We will argue by continuity from the case of   ≃ 0. Taking  ( ) =  0( )+ ( )/ , we
can create a family of economies that keep  ( ) ﬁxed at some ¯   as   varies near zero by
increasing the loss aversion of hedgers. With this, as   approaches zero, the equilibrium
intermediation policy converges to a policy that moves capital until the threshold  
is reached (with no changes in capital levels afterward), so the associated trigger ratio
converges to




which is independent of the capacity  . Moreover, the associated gain functions converge
to a gain function   with









Suppose ﬁrst that agents are patient (have a low discount rate  ). As   goes up,
capital heterogeneity goes down, hence the value of moving capital is lower. Moreover,
17a higher-capacity intermediary will more quickly run out of capital to be moved, and
thus stop receiving fees earlier. Overall, this implies by continuity that we can construct
example economies with small   such that, as   is reduced and other parameters are
held constant, the intermediary receives more fees, and for longer, and hence the value
function of investors is lower, resulting in a higher threshold.10
Now, we consider the opposite case of nearly myopic investors (high  ). The previous
argument breaks down: Investors do not care much about future heterogeneity; they care
mainly about the immediate gain from switching, which depends on current heterogeneity.
Moreover, the immediate fees are increasing with capacity. A higher-capacity interme-
diary therefore receives higher immediate fees, which reduces investors’ overall value of
switching capital and increases the threshold.
Numerical examples support this intuition. For   = 0.5,   = ¯  , and   = 0.04, for  
suﬃciently small and  ( ) = ¯   suﬃciently insensitive to  , the capital trigger   decreases
with   for 0.01 <   < 0.5. For the same   and   but taking   = 10, however, the trigger
ratio   increases with the intermediation capacity  , over the same interval.
4 Intermediary Competition
We now solve for equilibria with oligopolistic or perfectly competitive markets for inter-
mediation.
There are two channels through which intermediary competition aﬀects the equilib-
rium level of intermediation oﬀered by the market. First, an intermediary internalizes the
impact of intermediation intensity on the heterogeneity of capital levels across the two
markets, and thus the impact on the intermediary’s future proﬁts. A given intermediary
does not, however, internalize the eﬀect of increasing it’s intermediation on reducing the
proﬁt opportunities of other intermediaries. Through this ﬁrst channel, increasing the
number of intermediaries should therefore weakly increase the total amount of interme-
diation. In the benchmark case in which a loss event destroys all capital in the aﬀected
market, there is nothing to internalize, because the after-shock situation is independent of
the pre-shock heterogeneity level, and our upcoming Proposition 8 states that the thresh-
old is independent of the number of intermediaries. In Appendix C, we explain why the
10See Equation (15), which shows that   is decreasing in investors’s after-shock continuation value  0.
18increase is strict whenever shocks are partial, so that post-shock heterogeneity depends
on pre-shock heterogeneity.
Second, when in contact with an investor, an intermediary considers the ability of
the investor to compare the intermediation fee oﬀered with the fees oﬀered by other
intermediaries. This plays a role, in an extension of the model that is oﬀered later in this
section, in determining the eﬀective bargaining power of the intermediary, and through
that channel, has an impact on the proﬁtability of intermediation. We start by taking
bargaining power as ﬁxed and then endogenize the fees received by the intermediary.
4.1 Intermediary Competition At Fixed Bargaining Power
For a given bargaining power  , we show that equilibrium trigger policies for the oligopolis-
tic case can be translated directly from the case of monopolistic intermediation through
a simple inspection of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. From this, we
also obtain comparative statics directly from those of the monopolistic case.
For the oligopolistic case, we take   identical intermediaries, each with an upper bound
 /  on intermediation intensity, and with the same proportional cost   of intermediation.
The monopolistic case (  = 1) is the special case considered in the previous section. Thus,
all cases have the same feasible market dynamics and costs.
We consider only Markov time-homogeneous equilibria. Equilibrium incorporates the
degree to which intermediaries internalize the impact of their intermediation intensity
on the heterogeneity of capital levels across markets. For an oligopolistic equilibrium
in trigger strategies, each of the   intermediaries has a reduced value function  , with
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reﬂecting the presumption by the given intermediary that the   − 1 other intermediaries
have adopted a speciﬁc trigger capital ratio  . The equilibrium condition is that the same
trigger policy is optimal for the given intermediary. Veriﬁcation of the HJB solution as
the value function and of the optimality of the associated candidate policy function is as
19for the monopolistic case.
Thus, an equilibrium for the  -intermediary problem is again given by bang-bang
control for all intermediaries, each exerting no eﬀort when    <   and maximal inter-
mediation intensity  /  whenever    ≥  , for a trigger capital ratio  . We will show
that optimality implies that there is no intermediation at or below the capital ratio  
satisfying the smooth pasting condition  ′( ) = 0. This, along with (18), implies that




From (19), we see that an intermediary’s optimization problem in a setting with  
intermediaries is equivalent to that of a monopolistic intermediary with maximum inter-
mediation intensity  . Indeed, for a given threshold  , the monopolistic and oligopolistic
cases yield the same function   determining proportional intermediation fees, and hence
the same smooth-pasting condition (19). In fact, this is actually the unique equilibrium,
even allowing for the possibility of non-trigger strategies! To see this, consider any Markov
equilibrium, not necessarily of the trigger-ratio form, and let   denote the function de-
termining the associated gain from switching. An intermediary’s HJB equation is of the
form (18), except that (i) the aggregate of other intermediaries’ contact intensities may
be almost arbitrary, and (ii) the value functions may vary across intermediaries. Owing,
however, to the form of the HJB equation, the indiﬀerence condition is nevertheless given
by (19), and thus is the same for all intermediaries. This shows that any Markov equi-
librium must be symmetric and of the trigger form.11 In fact, repeating arguments from
the monopolistic case leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 8 With   intermediaries, there is a unique Markov, homogeneous equilib-
rium. This equilibrium is symmetric and determined by a trigger capital ratio equal to
that of a monopolistic intermediary with the oligopolistic maximal contact intensity  .
When shocks lead to a partial recovery of capital, however, the intermediation trigger
capital ratio   is strictly decreasing in the number   of intermediaries, as shown in
Appendix C.
11The trigger form comes from showing, as in the monopoly case (Lemma 2), that the function    →   ( ) is
increasing.
204.2 Endogenous Bargaining Power
Competition to supply intermediation may also have an impact on an intermediary’s share
of gains from trade when in contact with an investor. We next consider the implications
of market structure for the intermediary bargaining power  . With   > 1 intermediaries,
we suppose that some fraction    of investors are “well connected,” meaning that as
they prepare to switch capital from one market to another, they are in simultaneous
contact with more than one intermediary. The number of intermediaries with whom a
given investor is in contact could also be random, exploiting the law of large numbers,
in which case    can be taken to be the probability that an investor, when contacted,
is in contact with more than one intermediary. Intuitively, a well-connected investor has
more bargaining power than a “captive” investor, one who is in contact with only one
intermediary.
When modeling this intuition with a bargaining game, an issue is whether the con-
tacted intermediary is assumed to know whether the investor is in contact with other
intermediaries. We take this case.12 Another modeling approach is a multilateral bar-
gaining game with complete information, as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
We consider a bargaining procedure ` a la Rubinstein (1982), in which the investor
and a particular intermediary alternate oﬀers. In our continuous-time setting, the times
between oﬀer rounds can be treated as arbitrarily small, so the inter-round discount factor
can be taken to be 1. In that case, the investor and intermediary agree immediately to
split the surplus according to the Nash bargaining solution. The investor’s share depends
on his outside option. If the investor is captive, his outside option is simply  ( , ), the
value of remaining in the over-capitalized market. Thus, the normalized Nash product
associated with a proportional fee of   is
[ ( ) +   −  ( )][ℎ( ) −   −  ( )],
which is maximal at   =  ( )/2, corresponding to   = 1/2, meaning an equal splitting of
the gains with the intermediary.
12It would be possible to allow for one-sided information. The fees derived could be obtained as equilibrium outcomes
of a bargaining process, although there may be additional equilibria. See, for example, Sutton (1986). For an
alternative approach to treating uncertainty about the degree to which an intermediary’s customer is in contact with
other intermediaries, see Green (2007).
21For a well-connected investor, the normalized Nash product is
[ ( ) +   −  ( )][ℎ( ) −   −  ( ) − (1 −  0) ( )],
where  0 is the conjectured proportion of the gain from trade that the investor would
pay to another intermediary if this ﬁrst round of bargaining were to break down. The
Nash product is maximized at   = 0, for a proportional intermediary share of   = 0,
corresponding to the extraction of all surplus by the well-connected investor.13
If the number of intermediaries in contact with the investor is known only by the
investor, then   is similarly obtained, and depends on the probability that the investor is
captive.
Assuming pairwise independence of the connectedness of individual investors, the av-
erage of an intermediary’s share of gains across the inﬁnite population of investors is
almost surely
 ( ) = 0 ×    +
1
2
(1 −   ) =
1 −   
2
. (20)
In particular,  ( ) is decreasing in   if    is increasing in  . Obviously,  2 ≥  1.
Going beyond the case of   = 2, it is somewhat intuitive that an investor is more likely to
be well connected as the number of intermediaries increases. Appendix D brieﬂy outlines
a model with this natural feature.
Noting from (20) that  ( ) < 1/2, Proposition 7 hints that lowering  ( ) reduces an
intermediary’s incentive to search, all else equal, because, for given capital dynamics,
lowering  ( ) reduces intermediation proﬁts, and therefore lowers the marginal beneﬁt
of raising intermediation intensity. We will next illustrate the second channel through
which oligopolistic intermediation aﬀects capital mobility: By reducing each intermedi-
ary’s bargaining power, the incentive to intermediate is lowered.
Endogenous bargaining leads to complex dynamics, in which the number of interme-
diaries actively searching for capital varies over time. In order to see this, consider a
candidate equilibrium in which   intermediaries search at full capacity whenever   >  ,
and no intermediary searches when   ≤  . If a single intermediary deviates by searching
for capital when   is in a left neighborhood of  , then his fee per unit of capital switched is
that of a monopolist, not that of the  -intermediary case. This increases the value of this
13Another way to obtain this prediction is to assume that intermediaries connected to a given intermediary post
prices and engage in Bertrand competition.
22deviation. Despite this added complexity, we now show that oligopolistic intermediation
may reduce capital mobility.
4.3 Reduced Capital Mobility With More Intermediaries
A Markov strategy proﬁle for   intermediaries consists of functions  1, 2,...,   on
[1,∞) into [0, ¯  / ]. Here,   ( ) denotes the search intensity of intermediary   when the
heterogeneity of capital across the two markets is   =  / . The associated aggregate
capital mobility is
 ( ) =
   
 =1
  ( ).
In order to exploit the fee share  ( ) derived above, we focus on simple strategies, for
which   ( ) is either 0 or ¯  / . With this restriction,14 we can associate with any strategy
proﬁle an increasing sequence  0, 1,...,   of capital-ratio thresholds with the property
that, whenever the capital ratio    is in [  ,  +1), a particular set    of intermediaries
is active. We let    = ∣  ∣ denote the number of intermediaries in   .
Using our previous analysis of the oligopolistic case with ﬁxed bargaining power, we
say that a proﬁle of simple strategies is a Markov equilibrium if, for all   and   ∈ [  ,  +1),
 (  )  
 ( ) −
 
 
≥ 0,   ∈   , (21)
and
 (   + 1)  
 ( ) −
 
 
≤ 0,   / ∈   , (22)
where   ( ) denotes the marginal gain to a investor from switching to the market with
less capital, given an aggregate intensity policy  .
The ﬁrst inequality means that any intermediary searching at capital ratio   does
so optimally, given equilibrium fee share  (  ). The second equation states that any
intermediary not searching at capital ratio   does so optimally, given the equilibrium fee
share  (   +1) that he would get if he searched. We let   = inf{¯   :  ( ) = ¯  ,   ≥ ¯  }, the
smallest level of capital heterogeneity above which intermediaries search at full capacity.
We denote by  1 the monopolistic threshold. For the result to follow, recall that   is the
mean arrival rate of loss events and that   depends, through  , on the particular Markov
14Extending the analysis to general Markov strategies would be possible if one computes, for any possible strategy,
the expected fee for each intermediary as a function of his search intensity and of the aggregate search intensity.
23equilibrium under consideration. It is possible to show that in any equilibrium,    ( )
is increasing in  . (For this, see the proof of Proposition 11.) This and Equations (21)
and (22) imply that when  ( ) is decreasing in   (that is, a more connected investor pays
a lower fee), the number of active intermediaries is increasing in   in any equilibrium.
Proposition 9 (Monotonicity) Suppose that  ( ) is decreasing in  . Then,    is
increasing in  .
The following result applies for all equilibria.
Proposition 10 Suppose the number   of intermediaries is at least 2. There exists
some ¯   > 0 such that for any loss event intensity   ∈ (0, ¯  ) and any associated Markov
equilibrium trigger capital ratio  , we have  1 <  .
This results states that for suﬃciently infrequent loss events, the reduced bargaining
power caused by oligopolistic competition reduces the domain of maximal capital mobility
relative to that of the monopolistic case. Our assumption of a suﬃciently small mean
arrival rate   of loss events exploits the fact that intermediation fees are generated from the
time of each loss event until capital is suﬃciently equalized across the markets. Although
there are technical steps in the proof of this proposition, found in Appendix E, the
argument relies on a bound on improvements in the present value of intermediation fees
as one changes from one market setting to another. A simple way to provide such a bound
is thus to control the speed with which new fee-generating loss events occur.
Proposition 10 shows that oligopolistic competition results in less intermediation than
achieved by a monopolist, for some range of market heterogeneity. This does not, how-
ever, rule out intermediation by oligopolists at capital ratios below the monopolistic
trigger level. The next result shows that, provided that loss events are not expected too
frequently, oligopolistic and monopolistic settings lead to a cessation of intermediation at
approximately the same levels of market heterogeneity.
For any  -intermediary Markov equilibrium with aggregate intermediation strategy  ,
let
   = inf{  :  ( ) > 0},
the smallest heterogeneity level above which capital is mobile. A proof of the next propo-
sition may be found in Appendix E. We will rely on a suﬃciently small loss event intensity
24for the same bounding eﬀect explained after the statement of Proposition 10.
Proposition 11 For any   > 0, there exists a strictly positive ¯   such that for any mean
loss event rate   ∈ (0, ¯  ) and any associated Markov equilibrium with   players, we have
   ≥  1 −  .
Propositions 10 and 11 together show that capital mobility is lower, at any levels of
capital, with oligopolistic intermediation than with monopolistic intermediation, provided
that loss events are suﬃciently infrequent.15
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In a neoclassical model of asset markets, investors continually adjust their portfolios so
as to achieve the highest possible mean return for a given type of risk. In equilibrium,
an investor bearing a given type of risk is therefore compensated by a unique associated
excess mean rate of return, no matter the asset that carries the risk. In practice, however,
investors make portfolio adjustments with delays. In our model, the mobility of capital
across diﬀerent investments is increased through the equilibrium eﬀorts of intermediaries.
Our model has several implications for asset-price dynamics:
1. With unexpected changes in the amount of capital that is available to bear the
risk represented by an asset, risk premia adjust more severely to capital shocks
than in a neoclassical (perfect-mobility) setting, and then revert somewhat over
time as capital is redeployed. This time signature, present in essentially any setting
with slow moving capital, is dampened to the extent that intermediaries are active.
Consider for example our simplest setting in which capital levels change only at the
times at which all capital in a given asset market is lost. Perfect capital mobility
(  = 0,  = ∞) implies that     =     for all  . A loss event at time   in Market  
would cause half of the capital from Market   to move instantly to Market  , so risk
15For the last two results, we have held constant the dependence of the dividend rate function  ( ) on the capital
level   as the mean rate   of loss events is varied. We have the freedom, however, of varying the population of hedgers
as   changes, so as to oﬀset the impact of variation of   on  ( ), thereby satisfying the stated comparison between
monopolistic and oligopolistic intermediation for each ﬁxed economy.
25premia in both markets jump up by
 (   ) −  (   −) =
 
   −
,
and then remain constant until the next loss event. With imperfect mobility, how-
ever, the risk premium in market   would jump immediately to +∞ and then decline
at the rate    
 
 at until the capital heterogeneity ratio    =    /    drops to   or
until another loss event occurs.
2. The degree to which risk premia vary across assets, after controlling for other deter-
minants of risk premia, is increasing in the degree to which capital is heterogeneously
distributed across assets.
3. The speed of reversion of risk premia across assets toward common levels (after
adjustment for other determinants of risk premia) is decreasing in the cost of in-
termediation. Increasing intermediation capacity, however, can either increase or
reduce capital mobility, depending on the setting, as explained in Section 3.2.
4. All else equal, increasing the fraction of gross gains from moving capital that accrue
to intermediaries increases the speed of adjustment of capital and risk premia.
5. Lowering time discount rates increases the mobility of capital.
6. Increasing the volatility of asset returns, represented in our model by the mean fre-
quency   of loss events, can either increase or decrease the mobility of capital through
intermediation, depending on the relative magnitudes of the eﬀects of: (i) raising
neoclassical risk premia (thus increasing the rents available to intermediaries) and
(ii) increasing the volatility of capital heterogeneity at a given level of intermediation,
which lowers the incentive to intermediate.
7. Increasing the scope for intermediary competition by splitting the market among
more intermediaries can increase or decrease the equilibrium provision of intermedi-
ation, depending on the relative magnitudes of the eﬀects of (i) reducing the concern
of an intermediary regarding the impact of its own activity on lowering capital het-
erogeneity, and (ii) lowering the bargaining power of an intermediary vis-avis its
customers because of increased competition with other intermediaries. As the num-
ber of intermediaries increases, the former eﬀect raises intermediation incentives,
while the latter eﬀect can lower intermediation incentives.
26Our introduction uses the example of the market for catastrophe risk reinsurance.
Froot and O’Connell (1999), Zanjani (2002), and Born and Viscusi (2006) explain how
premiums for catastrophe risk insurance typically increase dramatically when insurance
and re-insurance ﬁrms suﬀer signiﬁcant damage claims after natural disasters, such as
Hurricane Andrews in 1992. Then, over many months, premiums drop toward “soft-
market” levels (absent other shocks to the capital of insurers) because the replacement of
insurance capital is delayed by institutional barriers to capital raising, including the time
spent searching for suitable new investors. According to Enz (2001), premiums swing up
and down by as much as 50% over multi-year periods, and are closely linked with changes
in the capital levels of insurers, regardless of whether these changes in capital are caused
by damage claims or by unexpected returns to the asset portfolios of insurers. From this,
we know that the dynamics of insurance premiums after a major natural catastrophe are
not caused mainly by inference concerning the arrival rate of future such events. We
also know that most of the observed price impacts are not caused by inference about
losses because major changes over time in insurance premiums following shocks to capital
levels are highly correlated across all major lines of property insurance covered by the
same pools of capital covering catastrophe risk.16 These other lines cover, for example
aviation, marine, motor, and proportional property. The link tying premium dynamics
across the various lines of insurance is the level of capital commonly available to bear
losses. Froot and O’Connell (1999) emphasize the slow speed of capital replacement as
the major cause of slow premium adjustments.
That there is scope for intermediaries to mobilize dormant capital is apparent from
a signiﬁcant body of evidence that, when left on their own, many individual investors
adjust their portfolios remarkably infrequently. For example, Ameriks and Zeldes (2004)
report that over a 10-year period, 44% of investors in their sample made no changes to
their portfolio allocations, and that an additional 17% of these investors made a single
re-allocation during this period. Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi (2006) ﬁnd
that, of 1.2 million U.S. employees covered by over 1,500 401(k) investment plans, approxi-
mately 80% initiated no trades over a two-year period, while an additional 10% made only
a single trade.17 Based on our theoretical results, one presumes that investor inattention
16See, for example, Enz (2001), page 5, Figure 1.
17For further evidence on the slowness of individual portfolio adjustments, see Lusardi (1999), Lusardi (2003),
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), and Bilias, Georgarakos, and Haliassos (2009).
27is more evident in the data when the cost of contacting individuals and deploying their
capital is large relative to the potential associated intermediation proﬁts. For example,
high-net-worth individual investors and institutional investors are likely to receive more
attention from intermediaries because of the amounts of capital they can deploy and the
associated higher total intermediation fees, than are most of the smaller investors whose
inattention is documented in this literature. This is consistent with evidence provided
by Bilias, Georgarakos, and Haliassos (2009) and Feldh¨ utter (2009). Further, variation
across investors in ﬁnancial sophistication (not captured in our model) may lead to a
negative correlation between the cost of achieving a given level of contact intensity and
the level of deployable capital. In our model, intermediaries cannot diﬀerentiate among
sub-classes of investors.
Delays in processing information for purposes of investment decisions are also in ev-
idence from “price momentum” following fundamental news, as documented empirically
by Chan (2003), Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2010), Dellavigna and Pollet (2009),
and Cohen and Lou (2010), among others. Given that most ﬁnancial intermediaries are
themselves likely to receive and processes fundamental news quickly relative to the time
for price reactions documented in this literature, one presumes that there are limits on the
average speed with which they can attract potential investors to such investment opportu-
nities. This inference is also consistent with numerous examples of slow price adjustments
to supply shocks in equity markets, including those of Holthausen and Mayers (1990), Sc-
holes (1972), Coval and Staﬀord (2007), Andrade, Chang, and Seasholes (2008), Kulak
(2008); with respect to supply shocks caused by index re-compositions, Shleifer (1986),
Harris and Gurel (1986), Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000), Chen, Noronha, and Singhal
(2004), and Greenwood (2005); and with respect to the expiration of commodity futures
contracts, Mou (2011).
In corporate bond markets, which are not traded on a central exchange, one observes
large price drops and delayed price recovery in connection with major downgrades or
defaults, as described by Hradsky and Long (1989) and Chen, Lookman, and Sch¨ urhoﬀ
(2008), when certain classes of investors have an incentive or a contractual requirement
to sell their holdings. Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) document the eﬀect on
convertible bond hedge funds of large capital redemptions in 2005. Convertible bond
prices dropped and rebounded over several months. A similar drop-and-rebound pattern
28was observed in connection was the LTCM collapse in 1998. Newman and Rierson (2003)
show that large issuances of European Telecom bonds during 1999-2002 temporarily raise
credit spreads throughout the sector, evidence that it takes time for intermediaries to
locate long-term investors.
In these examples, the time pattern of returns or prices after a supply or demand shock
reveals that the friction at work is not merely a transaction cost for trade. If that were
the nature of the friction, then all investors would immediately adjust their portfolios,
or not, optimally. The new market price and expected return would be immediately
established, and remain constant until the next change in fundamentals. In all of the
above examples, however, after the immediate price response, whose magnitude reﬂects
the size of the shock and the supply of immediately available capital, there is a relatively
lengthy period of time over which the price reverts in mean toward its new fundamental
level. In the meantime, additional shocks can occur, with overlapping consequences. The
typical pattern suggests that the initial price response is larger than would occur with
perfect capital mobility, and reﬂects the demand curve of the limited pool of investors that
are quickly available to absorb the shock. The speed of adjustment after the initial price
response is a reﬂection of the time that it takes more investors to realign their portfolios
in light of the new market conditions, or for the initially responding investors to gather
more capital.
In our setting, as in practice, there can be substantial diﬀerences in mean returns
across assets that are due not only to cross-sectional diﬀerences in “fundamental” cash-
ﬂow risks, but are also due to unbalanced distributions of capital, relative to a market
without intermediation frictions. Empirical “factor” models of asset returns do not often
account for factors related to the distribution of ownership of assets, or related to likely
changes in the distribution of ownership. Exceptions include the recent work of Coval
and Staﬀord (2007) and Lou (2009), who note that the conditional mean returns of an
equity tend to be lower due to price pressure when mutual funds owning that equity
are experiencing liquidation-motivated outﬂows, and that the conditional mean returns
recover as price pressure abates. Similarly, Bartram, Griﬃn, and Ng (2010) show that
divergent levels of ownership by national domiciles play a role in equity returns.
In our model, delays in portfolio adjustments are due to the time that it takes for
intermediaries to locate suitable investors. This is only an abstraction, which can also
29proxy for other forms of delay, including time to educate investors about assets with which
they have limited familiarity (awareness), time for contracting, and time for investors to
dispose of their current positions, which could involve similar delays and price shocks, as
suggested by Chaiserote (2008).
We could extend our model so as to treat asymmetric markets. Provided that the local
inverse demand function  (⋅) of each market satisﬁes similar homogeneity assumptions,
intermediation would be characterized by two distinct thresholds of capital ratios, one for
movement of capital from market   to market  , and another for the reverse movement.
For example, if returns in market   are riskier than those in market  , then, all else
equal, capital will be less mobile toward market   than toward market  . Asymmetry, for
example, would allow a consideration of capital mobility from a low-risk “money market”
into a high-risk market such as that for private equity. Many of the qualitative features
of our symmetric model, such as the dynamics of capital mobility and the impact of
intermediation competition, are anticipated to carry over to asymmetric settings, at least
under regularity conditions.
Another natural extension concerns the case of three or more markets. Consider, for
example, three symmetric markets diﬀering only in their capital levels, and satisfying our
homogeneity conditions. We conjecture that capital will ﬂow exclusively to the highest
premium market, with more mobility from the lowest-premium market than from the
mid-premium market one.
30Appendices
Appendices F through K are located in Duﬃe and Strulovici (2011), a supplement to
this paper.
A Equilibrium Analysis
Here, we provide a stochastic analysis of Markov equilibrium that is more complete and
general than that provided in the main text.
Given an intermediation contact intensity process   and initial conditions for capital
in each market, we let   
   denote the total capital in market   at time  . Given an
associated transaction-cost process  , the marginal value to a supplier of one additional
unit of capital in market   at time   is
 
 
   =  
   ∞
 
 
− ( − )  




 ( ), 
 




    ℱ 
 
, (23)
where    is the cumulative number of switches back and forth between the two markets
through time   by the holder of this unit of capital, and the market indicator  ( ) is  
or  , depending on whether, at time  , the accumulated capital    is currently located
in market   or  . This capital thus accumulates according to
    =   −    ( −)( ),
with initial condition    = 1. The market-indicator process   is a marked point process
with an initial condition at time   of  ( ) =  , and with an intensity of jumping from
market   to market   at time   of   1{ ￿
is > ￿
js}. In the equilibrium that we shall describe,
the value of switching from market   to market   is strictly positive if and only if   
   >   
  .
The marginal value of moving capital is thus
 
 
  = max( 
 
  , 
 
  ) − min( 
 
  , 
 
  ).
At each time  , intermediaries charge investors some fraction   ∈ [0,1] of the gain
  
  from switching each unit of capital. That is, the proportional intermediation fee is
  
  =    
 .
We restrict   to be a progressively-measurable process so that, at each time, the in-
termediary chooses a contact intensity that depends only on information that is currently
available.
31A monopolistic intermediary’s total rate of fee revenue is    max(   ,   ) Φ , where
Φ  =   
  is the gain from switching capital under policy  . Given the initial conditions
  
 0 =    and   
 0 =   , and given a gain-from-switching process Φ, the intermediary’s
utility for a contact intensity process   is
 (  ,  ,Φ, ) =  
   ∞
0
 
−    [ Φ  max( 
 
  , 
 
  ) −  ]  
 
.
We assume that the parameters are such that this utility is ﬁnite, which is the case
in the equilibria that we analyze. We restrict attention to intermediation policies that
depend on the available information only through the current capital levels (   ,   ).
The intermediary might otherwise prefer to commit once and for all time to a path-
dependent intensity policy that could, at some future time, be dominated by another
policy available at that time, given the current capital market conditions at that time.
The inability to commit to an intermediation strategy may in principle be overcome by
sophisticated punishment threats, as in Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) and Mailath and
Samuelson (2006). In such equilibria, if the intermediary deviates, investors would update
their beliefs about the intermediary’s strategy in a way that harms the intermediary. Such
equilibria are based on sophisticated oﬀ-equilibrium-path investor beliefs, which are not
in the spirit of our assumption that investors are less sophisticated than intermediaries.
Another possible justiﬁcation for our focus on Markov equilibria is the fact that more
sophisticated equilibria unravel in ﬁnite-horizon models where (possibly state-dependent)
stage games have a unique Nash equilibrium.
Given the symmetry of the two markets, it suﬃces to characterize equilibrium behavior
in terms of
   = max(   ,   )
   = min(   ,   ).




  = 1{ at> bt}      + 1{ at≤ bt}     
  
 
  = 1{ at≤ bt}      + 1{ at> bt}     .
From the L´ evy property, (  ,   ) has the same joint distribution as the primitive payoﬀ
processes (  ,  ).
32Because we restrict attention to an intermediation intensity process   that depends
only on current capital levels, and because of symmetry, we can suppose that    =
Λ(  ,  ) for some measurable policy function Λ : ℝ2
+ → [0, ] with the property that
there is a solution to the associated stochastic diﬀerential equation
    = −Λ(  ,  )      +      
 
  (24)
    = Λ(  ,  )      +      
 
  . (25)
Letting ℒ denote the space of intermediation intensity processes of this form, and
given an assumed gain-from-switching process Φ, the intermediary solves the problem
sup
 ∈ℒ
 ( , ,Φ, ). (26)
An equilibrium is a pair ( ,Φ) consisting of an intermediation intensity process   that
attains the supremum (26) given Φ, and such that Φ  =   
 . This deﬁnition includes
consistency with the optimality for investors to move their capital, in exchange for the
marginal fee determined by Φ, when contacted by the intermediary, and includes con-
sistency between the conjectured and actual dynamics for capital movements and search
intensity.
A.1 Homogeneous Case
Allowing somewhat more generality than in the main text, we take the inverse demand
function  (⋅) to be of the form  0+  −  for positive constants  0,  , and  . Also without
loss of generality, in the following we take  0 = 0 and, by re-scaling, we take   = 1.
That is, the equilibrium behavior for ( , ) is the same as that for (1, / ). Because the
intermediary has linear time-additive preferences and because of the homogeneity of  ,
and therefore of   , the ratio   =  /  of total capital in the over-capitalized market
to total capital in the under-capitalized market determines the optimal intermediation
intensity. Thus, we can further assume the independence of    and    without loss of
generality because any common L´ evy component would have no eﬀect on the ratio of  
to   . (The sole exception is a case of common jumps with a jump-size distribution that
supports −1, in which case there is a non-zero probability that    and    can be zero
simultaneously. We rule out this exception.)
33Consistent with the insurance example, we suppose that    and    are of the form
    =    +    , where   is a constant and    and    are independent compound Poisson
processes with common jump intensity   and a given jump-size probability distribution
 . The proportional payoﬀ processes processes    and    could also be given a common
Brownian component without aﬀecting our analysis, for this also has no eﬀect on the
relative proportions of capital in the two markets. Cases with market-speciﬁc Brownian
components are analyzed in Appendix K. Likewise, the constant drift rate   plays no
role in the analysis of optimal intermediation, and can be taken to be zero without loss
of generality for purposes of determining equilibrium intermediation policies. The eﬀect
of non-zero   on actual capital levels can be reintroduced later with the scaling by     of
both    and   .
The marginal gain from switching capital is
 
 
  =  
Λ(  ,  ) ≡  (  ,  ) −  (  ,  ), (27)
where, under our regularity,   and   satisfy the coupled equations (1)-(2). For general
 , letting  ( ) =   Λ( ,1) and  ( ) = Λ( ,1), the ODE (6) for   generalizes to
(  + 2  +  ( )(   + (1 −  ))) ( ) +  (1 +  ) ( ) 
′( ) = (1 +   0)(1 −  
− ). (28)
A.2 Veriﬁcation of Optimality of HJB Solution
This appendix provides a proof that the HJB equation (4) characterizes optimality, al-
lowing for a general gain function   Γ. For this, given an arbitrary intensity process  ,
let
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By Itˆ o’s Formula, a local martingale is deﬁned by
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Because   and ˆ   are bounded, this local martingale is in fact a martingale. From this
and the implication of the HJB equation that
− ˆ   ( 
 
  , 
 
  ) −  (ˆ   , 
 
  , 
 
  ,  ,Γ) ≤ 0,
34another application of Itˆ o’s formula implies that   is the sum of a decreasing process
and a martingale. Thus,   is a supermartingale. Because ˆ   is bounded, we have the
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Thus, for any intermediation intensity process  ,
ˆ   ( , ) ≥  ( , , ,Γ) ≡  
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0
 
−    [ 
 
    
Γ( 
 
  , 
 
  ) −  ]  
 
. (30)
Let Λ be a policy such that, for each ( , ), Λ( , ) attains the supremum (4). For each
 , let  ∗
  = Λ(  ,  ). Then, the fact that
− ˆ   (  ,  ) −  (ˆ   ,  ,  , 
∗
 ,Γ) = 0
implies that   is a martingale. Thus
ˆ   ( , ) =  ( , , 
∗,Γ). (31)
Thus, for any intermediation intensity process  ,
ˆ   ( , ) =  ( , , 
∗,Γ) ≥  ( , , ,Γ),
proving the result.
A.3 Nonnegativity of the Gain From Switching  
We now prove Proposition 2, allowing for general  . Because the righthand side of (28)
is strictly positive,   or  ′ must be strictly positive. This implies that   cannot cross
0 from above. Hence,   must be strictly positive on some interval of the form ( ,∞),
and is non-positive on [1, ] for some level  . It remains to show that   = 1. Because
 (1) = 0, the intermediary does not search when the markets have equal levels of capital,
given that   > 0. That is,  ( ) vanishes on a neighborhood of 1. From (28), this implies
that   is positive on that neighborhood, which concludes the proof.
The total-present-value conservation equation is
  ( , ) +   ( , ) +   ( , ) =  ( , ) −   ( , ),
35where  ( , ) is the present value of the total future cash ﬂows at rate    (  )+   (  ),
to be divided among the intermediaries and the investors, and   ( , ) is the the in-
termediary’s expected discounted search costs over the inﬁnite horizon, given a trigger
 .
Because   is homogeneous of degree −1, we have  ( , ) = 2/ . The search-cost
present value   (1,0) solves
  (1,0) =   +  [ 
−    (1,0)], (32)
where   is present value of search costs from time zero to the exponentially distributed
time   of the next loss event. We now show that, for the case of no recovery at loss event,
  (1,0) =
 ¯  
 
 
1 −  
−(2 + ) ( ) 
, (33)
where  ( ) = log(1 + 1/ )/¯  .
Starting with  0 = 1 and  0 = 0, for   <   we have
    = −¯    1{ t> }  
and
    = ¯    1{ t> }   .
This yields    =  −¯    and    = 1 −  −¯   , for   <  . The intermediary will stop searching
at that time  ( ) at which   ( ) =  , so
 −¯   ( )
1 −  −¯   ( ) =  .
This yields









The present value of search costs until the next loss event is
  =  
   min( ( ), )
0
 
−  ¯     
 
=
¯   
 
 
1 −  [ 
−  min( ( ), )]
 
.
Because   is exponentially distributed with parameter 2 ,
 ( 
−  ) =
2 
2  +  
and
 [ 
−  min( ( ), )] =
2  +   − (2 + ) ( )
2  +  
.
Substitution of these into (32) yields the result (33).
36A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
That   is bounded follows from the fact that it is dominated by 2/ . The monotonicity
result is based on two intermediate lemmas.
First, given the function   determining intermediation fees, let
 ( ) =
 
1 −  
−   
1 +   0
  + 2 
 
−  ( ).
The ﬁrst term of  ( ) is the present value of switching capital to the under-capitalized
market if the intermediary arrests intermediation eﬀorts from the point at which the
capital ratio    is at   until the next loss event occurs, given  0. (See (9).) Suppose in
particular, a given reduced policy  ( ) = Λ( ,1), and a particular   at which  ( ) = 0.
Then  ( ) = 0. As a special case,  (1) = 0 (which can also be checked directly from the
deﬁnition of   and the fact that  (1) = 0). We note that, since the ﬁrst term deﬁning   is
strictly increasing in  ,  ′( ) must be positive whenever  ′( ) is negative. Given a policy
 , we will show that   is nonnegative. In order to see this, we observe that for   ≥ 1,
(28) can be re-written as
 ( )[((1 −  ) +   )  +  (1 +  ) 
′] = (  + 2 ) ( ). (34)
We already know that  (1) = 0. Since   is positive from Proposition 2, this implies that
 ′( ) is negative whenever  ( ) ≤ 0, and hence that  ′ > 0 whenever   ≤ 0. Therefore,  
cannot cross 0 from above, which proves our ﬁrst lemma.
Lemma 1 For any policy,   is everywhere nonnegative.
This result is intuitive: other things equal, the expected gain from moving one’s capital
is larger if the intermediary immediately stops switching capital after that last movement,
since the diﬀerence between capital levels, and hence between premia, is larger in that case.
Lemma 1 has a crucial consequence for the case   = 1: The rate at which fees are paid
to the intermediary when he searches is strictly increasing in  . The more heterogeneous
the markets, the higher is the intermediary’s immediate proﬁt from switching. Since this
rate of fee payment, net of search costs, is    ( )− , we must show that   ( ) is strictly
increasing in  . We can re-write (34) when   = 1 as
 ( )(1 +  )( ( ) +   
′( )) = (  + 2 ) ( ) +   ( ) ( ).
37Since   is positive and   is nonnegative, this implies that  ( )+  ′( ) is positive whenever
 ( ) > 0, hence that   ( ) is strictly increasing in  . On any interval on which  ( ) = 0,
we have  ( ) = (1 +   0)/(  + 2 )(1 − 1/ ), so   is strictly increasing, and, a fortiori, so
is   ( ).
Lemma 2 For   = 1 and any policy, the revenue rate   ( ) is strictly increasing in  .
We can now show monotonicity of   for any trigger policy. From (13),   is constant
for   ≤  . Starting with some capital ratio  0 =   >  ,
 ( ) =  
    
0
 
−  [  (  )   −  ]1{ t> }    +  
−   0
 
,
where   is the time of the next loss event. The function    → [  ( )  −  ]1 >  is non-
decreasing in   from Lemma 2, and strictly increasing for   >  . For   <   <  ′, this
implies that  ( ) <  ( ′) (because the event time   has a distribution that does not
depend on   or  ′). This proves Proposition 3.
A.5 Optimality of a Trigger Policy
This appendix shows that for any equilibrium pair ( , ), the reduced policy function  
must be a trigger policy. In fact, we will show that for any switching-gain function   that
can arise as the result of an admissible intermediation policy, equilibrium or otherwise,
the optimal policy must be of the trigger form.
From Appendix A.2, we know that, for a given  , any bounded solution of the HJB
equation is the value to the intermediary of an optimal policy. We also know that   is
continuous (and, in fact, diﬀerentiable) from (10). From Lemma 2, we also know that for
any admissible policy,   ( ) must be increasing. Finally   must be such that the value
function   is bounded by 2/ . These conditions deﬁne what we call “admissibility” of  .
In particular, these conditions must be satisﬁed in any equilibrium.
We ﬁrst show that there exists a solution to the HJB equation that is achieved by a
trigger policy. Then we verify that any policy that achieves the value function that solves
the HJB equation must be of the trigger form.
For any equilibrium, the function   is bounded, because




38Therefore, given any candidates for the capital trigger ratio   and the constant  1, one
can integrate the HJB equation (14) on [ ,∞). The smooth-pasting condition is satis-
ﬁed if  ′( ) = 0, and this is equivalent to the condition that    ( ) =  . (For this,
see (11).) Given  , this uniquely determines  , because   ( ) is strictly increasing in  
by Lemma 2. The only diﬃculty is to show the consistency condition  1 = (2 /2  +  ) 0
(see (13)), where  0 = lim →∞ ( ), noting that  0 enters as a coeﬃcient of ODE 14 (in
the constant  ). In order to show this, we exploit the linearity of the ODE (14). Making
the change of variables  ( ) =  ( ) −  1, we have  ( ) = 0. The dynamics of   do not
depend on  0, in that
 ( ) +   (1 +  ) 
′( ) =  ( ), (35)
where  ( ) = ¯  (   ( ) −  )/(  + 2 ) and   = ¯  /(  + 2 ) > 0 is positive on ( ,∞).
Moreover, the limit  ∞ is by construction equal to  0− 1. This allows us to re-express the
consistency condition as  ∞ = ( /2  +  ) 0. Therefore, having integrated   over [ ,∞),
one may simply read oﬀ the values  0 and  1. The resulting function  ( ) =  ( )+ 1 solves
the initial HJB equation with a  0-dependent coeﬃcient, and also satisﬁes the smooth
pasting condition.
Thus, for any admissible  , there is an optimal policy of the trigger form. To conclude,
we will show that there are no policies solving the HJB equation that are not of the trigger
form. This follows from the linearity in ℓ of the HJB equation, implying a bang-bang
solution, which is strict because indiﬀerence is characterized by the equation    ( ) =  ,
which has a unique solution by Lemma 2. This analysis is summarized as follows.
Proposition 12 Suppose that the payout-rate function   is of the form  ( ) =  0+ / .
Then any equilibrium intermediation policy Λ corresponds to a trigger capital ratio  .
That is Λ( , ) = ¯  1{ /  > }.
A.6 Existence of Equilibrium
So far, we have shown that any equilibrium must be of the trigger form. In this appendix
we show that there exists such an equilibrium. Appendix A.7 shows uniqueness of such
equilibria.
For any candidate trigger capital ratio  , let  (  ∣ ) be the net expected gain from
switching capital across markets under the policy with trigger  , given current market
39heterogeneity  . We need to show that there exists some   such that    (  ∣ ) =  , that
is, such that the intermediary ceases intermediation, given the switching gain function
 (⋅) =  (⋅∣ ), exactly when   =  . It suﬃces to show that   (  ∣ ) takes all values
between 0 and ∞ as   varies from 1 to ∞.
Because   ( ) is increasing, equation (9) implies that
 (  ∣ ) ≥
(  − 1)
 (  + 2 )
,   ≥  .
This implies that   (  ∣ ) ≥ (  − 1)/(  + 2 ). We note that the lower bound grows
linearly with  . Because   (  ∣ ) = 0 for   = 1, we know that    →   (  ∣ ) goes
from 0 to ∞ as   goes from 0 to ∞. This function is continuous, so there exists some   ∗
such that   ∗ (  ∗ ∣  ∗) =  / .
Proposition 13 Suppose that the payout-rate function   is of the form  ( ) =  0+ / .
Then, there exists an equilibrium with a trigger policy.
A.7 Trigger Uniqueness
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that trigger levels   and  , with   <  , both
satisfy the equations of the proposition. Let  ( ) =   ( ) −   ( ) denote the diﬀerence
between the gains from switching capital under policies   and  , as a function of  .
(Throughout, we use superscripts to denote dependence on   or  .) From (15),   <  
implies that   
0 >   
0 . Optimality of   (respectively  ) with respect to    (respectively,
  ) implies that, for any   in ( , ],
   
 ( ) −   −  (1 +  )( 
 )
′( ) > 0
and
   
 ( ) −   −  (1 +  )( 
 )
′( ) ≤ 0.
Because (  )′( ) = 0 for   in this interval (  <  ], while (  )′( ) ≥ 0 by Proposition 3,
we know that  ( ) < 0. Subtracting the version of equation (7) for   from the version
of the same equation for   yields
(  +  )  +  (1 +  ) 






,   >  , (36)
40where
  =
  + 2 
¯  
+ (1 −  ) > 0
and
  =
 (  




Because  ( ) < 0, this18 implies that   < 0 for   >  , so that   is everywhere negative.
By deﬁnition,  0 is the marginal value of capital held by investors in the overcapitalized






where Φ0 is the expected discounted value of all future fees that investors will pay to
the intermediary. (Recall that 2/  is the expected discounted stream of dividends paid
on both markets. We have seen that   < 0, that is,   ( ) >   ( ) for all   >  . This
means that investors pay, for any  , more fees with   than with   for   >  . Moreover,
for   ∈ [ , ], investors pay fees (which are positive, from Proposition 2) for trigger  ,
whereas they pay nothing for trigger  . Therefore, Φ 
0 > Φ 
0 , which implies from (37)
that   
0 <   
0 , a contradiction. ■
B Numerical Illustration with Partial Recovery
We provide an illustrative example of equilibrium for the case of partial recovery, which
is analyzed in Appendix I. We take the parameters   = 0.04,   = 1.5,   = 0.04,   = 0.1,
  = 1/30. We assume beta-distributed recovery (one minus proportion lost) on (0,1),
with parameters (5,1). The equilibrium intermediation trigger ratio   of capital in the
over-capitalized market to capital in the under-capitalized market is found numerically
to be 1.465.
Figure 1 shows simulated sample paths of the capitalization ratio    =   /   and the
immediate return  (  )/ (  ) to a supplier of capital, before transactions fees, associated
with switching capital into the under-capitalized market. Figure 2 shows the present
values, with one unit of capital in the under-capitalized market, of future cash ﬂows to a
provider of one unit capital in the over-capitalized market (net of fees), to a provider of
18Indeed,  ( ) = 0 implies that  ′( ) < 0, so   cannot cross zero from below.





















































Figure 1: Simulated sample paths of the capitalization ratio,  t =  t/ t, and the return from switching,  ( t)/ ( t).
one unit of capital in the under-capitalized market (net of fees), and to the intermediary
(in the form of fees net of search costs). These are, respectively,  ( ), ℎ( ), and  ( ), and
depend on the ratio   =  /  of the level of capital   in the over-capitalized market to the
level   of capital in the under-capitalized market.
C Intermediary Competition with Partial Recovery
Here, we discuss the case of oligopolistic competition with partial recovery. Recall
from (59) the smooth-pasting condition for the monopolistic case:
   ( ) −   =  (1 +  ) 
′( ). (38)
One can see that the trigger capital ratio   is determined not only by the function  
determining the marginal gain from moving capital, but also by the derivative  ′( ) of
the intermediary’s value function. In order to understand the impact of oligopolistic


























Cross-market capital ratio  
Figure 2: Value function  ( ) of the intermediary and the marginal values  ( ) and ℎ( ) of capital held in the
over-capitalized and undercapitalized markets, respectively.
intermediation, suppose that intermediaries were to use, instead of the optimal trigger
ratio  , the equilibrium trigger ratio of a monopolist with the same aggregate capacity
for intermediation. In that case,   would be unchanged. Each intermediary, however,
would receive only a fraction 1/  of the total intermediation fees. The righthand side
of (38) is thus lowered, implying that intermediaries prefer to continue intermediating
after the capital ratio exceeds the monopolistic trigger. This is the ﬁrst channel through
which oligopolistic competition matters: Because an oligopolistic intermediary does not
internalize the full impact of his search on intermediation fees, he has a greater incentive
to intermediate. More precisely, an intermediary does not work for opportunities to move
capital when the immediate net marginal beneﬁt of doing so,    ( ) −  , is below the
marginal value  (1 +  ) ′( ) associated with future capital heterogeneity. For a given
trigger ratio  , an intermediary’s value function   declines in direct proportion to the
number   of intermediaries, and, hence, so does the derivative  ′. This implies that the
term  (1 +  ) ′( ) diminishes with  , while the immediate marginal beneﬁt    ( ) −  
43is unchanged, keeping   constant. Thus, as   increases, the incentive to intermediate
at the given trigger ratio   becomes strictly positive, prompting intermediaries to search
more.19
As   goes to inﬁnity, an intermediary’s value function goes to zero (because the size of
the pie to be shared among intermediaries is uniformly bounded above by 2/ ), and the
derivative  ′( ) also goes to 0. The limit as   diverges is the competitive equilibrium, in
which the trigger capital ratio   is determined by
   ( ) −   = 0.
With perfect competition, an intermediary has no impact on aggregate search activity,
and thus cares only about the immediate net beneﬁt from switching.
D Connectedness
In this appendix, we outline a model with the natural feature that an investor is increas-
ingly likely to be in contact with multiple intermediaries at the point of bargaining as the
total number of intermediaries is increased.
Suppose that there is an advertising medium handling intermediary ads. An inter-
mediary’s eﬀort corresponds to the probability   that its advertisement will place the
intermediary in contact with an investor at the time at which the investor checks the
medium. We assume that   is bounded by some capacity constraint ¯   < 1. Each investor,
pairwise independently across investors, has some exogenous intensity   for the times of
monitoring his capital and observing the advertising medium.20 This is consistent with
the framework of our main model: The intensity of times at which an investor is contacted
by least one intermediary is    ( ), where
  ( ) = 1 − (1 −  )
 .
Then,   =    (¯  ) is the intermediation capacity parameter of the basic model. Assuming
that a well-connected investor initiates bargaining with a randomly selected intermediary
19When there is zero recovery from a loss event, the after-event heterogeneity (which is inﬁnite) does not depend
of the pre-event heterogeneity. In that case, intermediaries already ignore the impact of their search activity on
heterogeneity and the monopolistic solution coincides with the competitive one.
20At such times, the investor observes the medium and plays a bargaining game with advertised intermediaries. If
bargaining breaks down, the investor leaves his capital in the large market, until the next monitoring time.
44from among those contacted, each intermediary has maximal contact intensity  / . The
probability that, when in contact with an intermediary, an investor is in contact with at
least two intermediaries is
  ( ) = 1 − (1 −  )
  −   (1 −  )
 −1.
For a ﬁxed   ∈ [0,1], let ¯    solve   (¯   ) =  , so that ¯   is independent of  , as in our
basic model. One may easily check that ¯    is decreasing in  . Moreover, using that
  (  ) = ¯   −    (1 −   )
 −1 = ¯   −
(1 − ¯  )   
1 −   
,
one can show that   (  ) is increasing in  .21 Therefore, keeping constant the ﬂow of
investors being contacted at any given time, the average number of intermediaries in
contact with any given investor is increasing in  . As the number of intermediaries goes
to inﬁnity, the probability that investor is well connected is:
lim
 →∞
  (  ) = ¯   + (1 − ¯  )log(1 − ¯  ).
The second term is negative. This speciﬁcation can be generalized to an arbitrary number
of media, with the same result that    is increasing in  .
E Proofs of Results in Section 4.3
Proof of Proposition 10. As before, we let   
0 =  (1,0), under strategy  . For any
equilibrium with aggregate mobility    →  ( ) and fee    →  ( ), one can easily modify
the proof of Lemmas 1 and 2 to show that
 
 ( ) ≡
 
1 +    
0












1 +   1
0







21In order to verify this, one is to show that   n/(1− n) is decreasing. Expressing  n in terms of   = (1− ¯  )−1 > 1
and letting   = 1/ , this is equivalent to showing that ( x − 1)/  is increasing in  . This is easily done by checking
the positivity of the derivative, whose numerator is increasing in   =  x and vanishes for   = 1.
45where  1 and  1
0 denote the corresponding quantities for the monopolistic case, since the
intermediary does not search at  . Further,
 
 ( ) ≤
 
1 +    
0

















0 −   
0
  + 2 
 
(  − 1). (39)
Since   
0 ≤ 2/  for any policy, there exists, for any   > 0, some ¯   such that for all   < ¯  ,
the righthand side of (39) is bounded in norm by   whenever   ≤  1, since we also have
an upper bound on  1 from (15). Choosing   below (1/ ( ) − 1/ (1))  and setting ¯  
accordingly, we have for any   ≤  1,





 ( )  





(  −  ( ) ) >  , (40)
which shows that it is strictly optimal for the monopolist to search at  , contradicting
the assumption that   ≤  1.
Proof of Proposition 11. At   , it cannot be strictly proﬁtable for an intermediary
to deviate by continuing to search and receive the net payoﬀ  (1)    (  ) −   per unit
of eﬀort, but it was proﬁtable to some intermediaries to search at a capital heterogeneity
just above   . This implies that    must satisfy the equation
 (1)   
 (  ) =  .
In words, there is a single active intermediary just before    is reached. We recall from
the monopolistic case that  1 satisﬁes the equation
 (1) 1 
1( 1) =  .
Therefore, it suﬃces to show that the roots of these two equations are arbitrarily close if
  is arbitrarily small. We have
 
 (  ) =
 
1 +    
0










1 +   1
0







46Therefore,    and  1 must satisfy
 
1 +    
0
  + 2 
 
(   − 1) −
 
1 +   1
0
  + 2 
 
( 1 − 1) = 0,
which may be rewritten as
 
1 +    
0
  + 2 
 
(   −  1) =  
 
  
0 −  1
0
  + 2 
 
(1 +  1).
Because  1 is uniformly bounded from (15) and because both   
0 and  1
0 are bounded by
2/ , the righthand side is less than   if   is chosen small enough. The ﬁrst factor of the
lefthand side is equivalent to 1/  when   is small enough. Combining these observations
shows that ∣   −  1∣ ≤   for any arbitrary   > 0, provided that   is small enough.
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